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ABSTRACT: Long before techlash became popular, the European Data Protection 
Supervisor (EDPS) was holding up a mirror to the EU competition authority. Not 
only the effectiveness of competition rules’ enforcement in the age of big data was 
questioned, but the suggestion was made to substantially improve the interaction, 
i.e. strengthen the family ties between competition, data protection and consumer 
protection. The importance of this suggestion was recently acknowledged by the EU 
Commissioner and Executive Vice-President of the European Commission Margrethe 
Vestager at a lecture delivered in memorial of the former EDPS Giovanni Buttarelli: 
“[i]n this time of fast and radical change, all of us have a lot to learn from each other. 
And if we work together in the spirit that Giovanni Buttarelli showed us, we can 
achieve his cherished aim – a digital future that works for human beings”. 
The article’s main purpose is to take stock of the current state of the interplay between 
data protection and competition law against the background of the roadmap presci-
ently put forth by the EDPS since 2014. Moreover, in the spirit that Giovanni Buttarelli 
showed us, it is suggested that new forms of collaborative enforcement should be 
explored, the workings of the Digital Clearinghouse progressively institutionalised, 
also at national level, and, most importantly, that a pro-competitive data governance 
framework should be developed in a cooperative manner.
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I. Introduction
In early 2014, Peter Hustinx, then European Data Protection Supervisor 
(EDPS), published a Preliminary Opinion suggesting numerous ways in 
which data protection law could be incorporated in the enforcement of 
competition law.1 The 2014 Preliminary Opinion presented the first find-
ings of the EDPS on the interplay between data protection and competition 
law. This early exploratory exercise was followed in 2016 by an Opinion by 
Giovanni Buttarelli, Peter Hustinx’s successor, on the coherent enforce-
ment of fundamental rights in the age of big data 2, as well as by seminal 
speeches and articles.3 Six years on, it is fair to recognise that the work 
of this EU institution, relentlessly advocating in favour of stronger and 
better “family ties”4 between these two areas of law, has been especially 
influential in shaping overall data governance in the digital age. Data, and 
personal data in particular, is both key to understanding new strategies 
and practices underpinning business activity in the digital environment 
and to provide suitable concepts and tools to adequately respond to policy 
challenges. In July 2019, Martin Selmayr, then Secretary-General of the 
European Commission, called the convergence of competition and data 
protection “the running theme of the next five years”.5
1 “Preliminary Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor – Privacy and competitive-
ness in the age of big data: The interplay between data protection, competition law and consumer 
protection in the Digital Economy”, European Data Protection, 2014, https://edps.europa.eu/sites/
edp/files/publication/14-03-26_competitition_law_big_data_en.pdf.
2 “Opinion 8/2016, EDPS Opinion on coherent enforcement of fundamental rights in the age of big 
data”, European Data Protection Supervisor, 2016, https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publica-
tion/16-09-23_bigdata_opinion_en.pdf.
3 Among the numerous contributions that Giovanni Buttarelli devoted to this specific topic 
see in particular Giovanni Buttarelli, “Les données et la concurrence dans l’économie numé-
rique, Opening statement at the roundtable on data and competition hosted by l’Autorité de la 
Concurrence, Paris”, EDPS, 2016, https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/16-03-08_
paris_speech_gb_en.pdf; Giovanni Buttarelli, “Competition Rebooted: Enforcement and personal 
data in digital markets”, EDPS, 2015, https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/15-09-24_
era_gb_en.pdf; Giovanni Buttarelli, “Big step towards coherent enforcement in the digital econ-
omy”, EDPS Blog, 2019, https://edps.europa.eu/press-publications/press-news/blog/big-step-
towards-coherent-enforcement-digital-economy_en; Giovanni Buttarelli, “This is not an article 
on data protection and competition law”, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, February (2019), https://www.
competitionpolicyinternational.com/category/antitrust-chronicle/antitrust-chronicle-2019/.
4 Cfr. Francisco Costa-Cabral and Orla Lynskey, “Family Ties: The Intersection between data pro-
tection and competition in EU law”, Common Market Law Review 54, no. 1 (2017): 11.
5 Nicholas Vinocur, Simon Van Dorpe and Laurens Cerulus, “Europe looks beyond fining Big Tech 
– to changing its business model”, Politico, July 14, 2019, https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-
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The important role already played in this regard by the EDPS was also 
acknowledged by the EU Commissioner and Executive Vice-President of 
the European Commission Margrethe Vestager at a recent lecture deliv-
ered in memorial6 of Giovanni Buttarelli: “[i]n this time of fast and radi-
cal change, all of us have a lot to learn from each other. And if we work 
together in the spirit that Giovanni Buttarelli showed us, we can achieve 
his cherished aim – a digital future that works for human beings”.7
The paper’s main purpose is to take stock of the current state of the 
interplay between data protection and competition law against the back-
ground of the roadmap presciently put forth by the EDPS since 2014. It is 
by now universally acknowledged that data is at the heart of the digital 
economy (II). In the last six years, it has also become clear that privacy can 
be a competition/antitrust issue (III). Increasingly, competition authorities 
have also come to realise that data accumulation is a source of power that 
should not escape antitrust scrutiny (IV). In addition to describing the 
current interplay between these two fields of law, the article, in Giovanni 
Buttarelli’s spirit, charts some directions in which the family ties between 
data protection and competition law could evolve and improve. It is sug-
gested that new forms of collaborative enforcement should be explored, 
the workings of the Digital Clearinghouse progressively institutionalised, 
also at national level, and, most importantly, that a pro-competitive data 
governance framework should be developed in a cooperative manner (V). 8
II. Data is at the heart of the (digital) economy 
Peter Hustinx, Giovanni Buttarelli’s predecessor to the role of European 
Data Protection Supervisor, remarked in a 2013 speech that personal data 
was increasingly relevant and that this “simply cannot be ignored as a rel-
evant element to take into account by authorities charged with the enforce-
ment of competition law, and the same applies obviously to authorities 
looksbeyond-fining-big-tech-to-changing-its-business-model/ (the recording of the conference 
mentioned in the press article is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3JI33s5e53M).
6 Christian D’Cunha, “In memory of Giovanni Buttarelli”, International Data Privacy Law 9, no. 
3 (2019): 129.
7 Margrethe Vestager, “Privacy and competition in an age of data”, IAPP Europe Data Protection 
Congress, Brussels, 21 November 2019.
8 This is the paper’s not-so-hidden aspiration to say ‘qualcosa di fico,’ as Giovanni Buttarelli him-
self would put it, see “Privacy 2030”, Giovanni Buttarelli’s ‘manifesto’, Presentation by Christian 
D’Cunha at the IAPP Data Protection Congress, Brussels, 21 November 2019 (“to shake things up, 
say something new - qualcosa di fico”).
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charged with the enforcement of data protection law, like my own”.9 He 
went on offering a broad overview of the possible interfaces between these 
two legal fields from the point of view of a data protection enforcer. These 
early thoughts were further detailed in the 2014 “Preliminary Opinion on 
the interplay between data protection, competition law and consumer pro-
tection in the Digital Economy” (2014 Preliminary Opinion)10 and in the 
2016 “Opinion on coherent enforcement of fundamental rights in the age 
of big data” (2016 Opinion).11 
According to the EDPS, data, data protection law and competition law in 
the age of big data are inexorably linked. Value-creating economic activi-
ties conducted by undertakings in this field, namely data harvesting, stor-
age, structuring, analysis and, finally, usage,12 touch upon these two areas 
of the law in a cross-cutting fashion. Well before becoming a fashionable 
topic inside competition policy circles, it did not escape the small and 
attentive EU institution that “big data [seemed] to be the way forward for a 
huge number of economic activities” and that this required thorough anal-
ysis from the economic and also societal perspectives”.13 To some extent, 
the Preliminary Opinion was “gingerly wading into uncharted waters” 
at a time when “the honeymoon with Big Tech had not quite yet run its 
course”.14 
The Preliminary Opinion pointed out that “[i]n the digital economy per-
sonal information represents a significant intangible asset in value crea-
tion and a currency in the exchange of online services”.15 As to the busi-
ness model designed to capture the value of big data, the EDPS analysed 
in particular two-sided or multisided platform “cross-financing distinct 
9 See Peter Hustinx, “Data protection and competition: interfaces and interaction”, EDPS, 2013, 
https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/our-work/publications/speeches-articles/data-protection-
and-competition-interfaces_en.
10 “Preliminary Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor”.
11 “Opinion 8/2016”.
12 “Exploring the economics of personal data”, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), 2013.
13 Hustinx, “Data protection”, 1.
14 See Christian D’Cunha, “Best of frenemies? Reflections on privacy and competition four years 
after the EDPS Preliminary Opinion”, International Data Privacy Law 8, no. 3 (2018): 253.
15 “Preliminary Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor”, 37. In 2008, the OECD had 
already defined personal data as the basic currency of the information economy, see Angel Gurría, 
“Closing remarks by Angel Gurría, OECD Ministerial Meeting on the Future of the Internet 
Economy”, OECD, 2008, https://www.oecd.org/korea/closingremarksbyangelgurriaoecdministe-
rialmeetingonthefutureoftheinterneteconomy.htm.
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services provided to two or more distinct user groups, that is, users of ‘free’ 
services on the one hand, and other businesses and especially advertis-
ers, on the other”.16 Anticipating by five years one of the central themes 
of Shoshana Zuboff’s seminal work ”Surveillance Capitalism”, published 
in early 2019,17 the EDPS remarked that “businesses (...) are increasingly 
using massive volumes of personal information to understand, predict and 
shape human behaviour”.18 
As confirmed by numerous recent reports and studies, personal data plays 
several functions in the current phase of the digital economy. First, data 
has become an instrument used to enable economic transactions (“data as 
medium of exchange”). As explained by the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC) in a recent Report, “[u]sers effectively pay 
for (…) services [provided by Google and Facebook] by allowing [them] to 
collect and use their data and by viewing advertisements”.19 Second, data is 
quickly becoming one of the most important competitive assets for firms 
(“data as input”), and this is going to become even more important in the 
upcoming digital age, as AI-fuelled products and services need access to 
data to be able to compete. AI models trained on data are able to provide a 
better product or service to the individual who generated some of data, for 
instance improved maintenance services to a connected device they use, or 
it can be employed for entirely unrelated purposes. Third, data is increas-
ingly the backbone of economic activity in the current industrial era. In 
this respect, an unhindered flow of data is increasingly considered nec-
essary for the good functioning of data-driven markets and for a healthy 
economy overall (“data as infrastructure”). 
The EDPS’ Preliminary Opinion also pointed out that big data markets 
are often characterised by economies of scale. The initial up-front invest-
ment and fixed costs to capture, assemble and process data are high, as it 
is required for instance to set up a complex digital infrastructure such as a 
social network or a search engine. Once the digital platform has ‘ignited’, 
however, the marginal cost of adding an extra user is extremely low. A 
16 “Preliminary Opinion”, 10.
17 Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New 
Frontier of Power (United States of America: Public Affairs/Hachette Book Group, 2019), 8 (“[sur-
veillance capitalists intervene] in the state of play in order to nudge, coax, tune, and herd behaviour 
toward profitable outcomes”).
18 “Preliminary Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor”, 6 (emphasis added).
19 “Digital Platforms Inquiry: Final Report, June 2019”, Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC), 9.
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recent Report written by Special Advisers to Competition Commissioner 
Vestager states in this regard that, while economies of scale character-
ise a range of industries, “the digital world pushes it to the extreme and 
this can result in a significant competitive advantage for incumbents”.20 
Beyond economies of scale, particularly significant are what have been 
called “advantages of scope”, such as those enjoyed by Facebook in provid-
ing differentiated but closely related services. The ACCC considers that a 
digital platform such as Facebook could enjoy significant advantages of 
scope using its wide range of services in order to accumulate user data and 
then tracking users on “websites that utilize Facebook business tools or are 
part of Facebook Audience Network”.21
Moreover, the EDPS is already well aware of the important role of net-
work effects in the age of big data.22 This has become increasingly obvious 
in the last six years. As a recent Report written for the UK government 
explains, “[n]etwork effects mean that platforms become more valuable 
to their users as they grow, which in turn makes them a more attractive 
proposition to further prospective users”.23 Thus, the value of Facebook to 
individual users depends on the participation of other users (same-side or 
direct network effects). Similarly, for both the general search market and 
the social media market, the benefits to advertisers of using these platforms 
increase with the number of consumers using them (cross-side or indirect 
network effects). In the mainstream economic literature on multi-sided 
markets, these cross-side network effects are also essential in explaining 
why platforms have an incentive to subsidise groups of users by charging 
a zero (or extremely low) monetary price for the services (and products) 
they offer. As to network effects that are strictly dependent on the amount 
of user data that digital platforms collect, these can again be same-sided 
or cross-sided. Same-side network effects that arise from data accumula-
tion are for instance those that, according to the ACCC, Google’s search 
platform enjoys, namely due to the relationship between the quantity of 
20 Jacques Crémer, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, and Heike Schweitzer, “Competition policy for 
the digital era - Report”, European Commission, 2019, 2, https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publica-
tions/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf.
21 “Digital platforms inquiry”, ACCC, 9.
22 “Preliminary Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor”, 23.
23 Jason Furman, Diane Coyle, Amelia Fletcher, Derek McAules, and Philip Marsden, “Unlocking 
digital competition: Report of the Digital Competition Expert Panel”, UK Government, under 
“Competition”, 35, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/785547/unlocking_digital_competition_furman_review_web.pdf.
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data and the quality of the search service. Google’s ongoing accumula-
tion of a considerable quantity of data on the users of its search platform 
(and how users interact with the platform) improves the relevance algo-
rithm in the search engine, thereby increasing the quality of the search 
service. In particular, as the ACCC found, “large quantities of these types 
of data improves the ability for the algorithm to generate reliable relevance 
rankings for queries that are uncommon”.24 This is also called a user feed-
back loop: improving the quality of the search algorithm, Google is able 
to draw in more users, creating a virtuous circle. As put by the already 
mentioned UK Report, “[a] data-rich incumbent is able to cement its posi-
tion by improving its service and making it more targeted for users, as 
well as making more money by better targeting its advertising”.25 As to the 
cross-sided and data-related network effects, these pertain to the circum-
stance that if an advertising-dependent platform like Google Search has 
more users and therefore access to more data, it can improve the relevance 
of ads presented to users. As the ACCC puts it, “[a]ll else being equal, an 
advertiser may prefer a larger platform, because its ads will tend to be more 
targeted”.26
Beyond the early acknowledgement of the risks and challenges of big 
data, the EDPS was also quick to stress the technology’s potential to 
“deliver significant benefits and efficiencies for society and individuals 
not only in health, scientific research, the environment and other specific 
areas”.27 Again, anticipating actual reflections in competition policy circles 
on how to empower consumers in the age of big data,28 in 2015 the EU 
institution made clear the importance of transparency, access to data, data 
portability and the roll out of “personal data spaces” in order to promote 
the benefits of big data in a way that is consistent with fundamental rights 
and values.29 
24 “Digital platforms inquiry”, ACCC, 66.
25 Furman et al., “Unlocking digital competition”, under “Competition”, 33.
26 “Digital Platforms Inquiry”, ACCC, 64.
27 “Opinion 7/2015, Meeting the challenges of big data: A call for transparency, user control, data 
protection by design and accountability”, EDPS, 2015, https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/pub-
lication/15-11-19_big_data_en.pdf. See also D’Cunha, “In memory”, 130 (“Buttarelli (…) recog-
nized from early on that the ability to do new things with enormous datasets could be a positive 
development if it was genuinely to improve the lives of most people”).
28 See, “Online platforms and digital advertising: Market study interim report”, Competition and 
Markets Authority (CMA), 2019. 
29 “Opinion 7/2015”. 
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III. Privacy is a competition/antitrust issue 
At the end of the first decade of this millennium, it was still commonly 
held that privacy was not an antitrust issue.30 On the contrary, a popular 
belief was that a high level of data protection could likely result in less 
competition and consumer welfare.31 This tension surfaced at the time of 
the Google/DoubleClick merger. On both sides of the Atlantic, competition 
authorities agreed that the merger review had to consider the combina-
tion of the parties’ databases solely from the perspective of negative effects 
on competition.32 The US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) expressly 
stated that “[n]ot only does the Commission lack legal authority to require 
conditions to this merger that do not relate to antitrust, [but] regulating 
the privacy requirements of just one company could itself pose a serious 
detriment to competition in this vast and rapidly evolving industry”.33 In 
the EU, the Commission’s argument in Google/DoubleClick seemed to 
find support in an almost contemporary pronouncement by the Court 
of Justice of the European Union. The Court stated in Asnef-Equifax that 
“any possible issues relating to the sensitivity of personal data are not, as 
such, a matter for competition law, they may be resolved on the basis of 
the relevant provisions governing data protection”.34 Seven years later, 
in the 2014 Facebook/WhatsApp merger decision, the Commission still 
expressed a very similar view when it held that “[a]ny privacy-related con-
cerns flowing from the increased concentration of data within the control 
of Facebook as a result of the Transaction do not fall within the scope of 
30 Simonetta Vezzoso, “Pro-competitive regulation of personal data protection in the EU”, in State-
Initiated Restraints of Competition, ed. Josef Drexl and Vicente Bagnoli (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2015), 201 (“The competition authorities’ stance in Google/DoubleClick is not surprising. 
In fact, most competition scholars and practitioners would likely agree that privacy as such is not 
a competition issue”).
31 Ibid.
32 European Commission Decision of 11 March 2008, Google/ DoubleClick, Case COMP/M.4731, 
OJ C 187, p. 10; Federal Trade Commission, “Statement of the Federal Trade Commission 
Concerning Google/ DoubleClick”, FTC File No. 071-0170 (20 December 2007).
33 Ibid.
34 Judgment of 23 November 2006, Asnef-Equifax, Servicios de Información sobre Solvencia y 
Crédito, SL and Administración del Estado v. Asociación de Usuarios de Servicios Bancarios 
(Ausbanc), C-238/05, EU:C:2006:734. For the interesting background from which this ruling origi-
nated see Federico Ferretti, “The legal framework of consumer credit bureaus and credit scoring 
in the European Union: Pitfalls and challenge – overindebtedness, responsible lending, market 
integration, and fundamental rights”, Suffolk University Law Review 46 (2013): 791.
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the EU competition law rules but within the scope of the EU data protec-
tion rules”.35 Currently, this argument is increasingly qualified also from 
a sound economic perspective. As put for instance by the former Chief 
Economy at DG Competition Tommaso Valletti, “[l]imited data protec-
tion can…lead to both exploitative and exclusionary conduct by dominant 
platforms” 36 Data protection authorities, and the EDPS in particular, have 
been influential in making this happen. 
A bird’s view of the interplay between data protection and competi-
tion law, as developed specifically from the point of view of a data pro-
tection authority, identifies at least four potentially relevant levels37: first, 
data protection forms part of the legal, (market) institutional background 
for competitive assessments; second, the data protection perspective can 
be relevant at the substantive level, in the application of the competition 
policy legal framework; third, data protection concerns can act as exter-
nal constraints to the application of competition law, such as devising a 
data access remedy to a competition law infringement; finally, data protec-
tion matters at the more procedural level, namely when the competition 
enforcer processes personal data in the course of its enforcement activities. 
The first level, which points to a minimalist interplay between competition 
law and data protection law, is largely uncontroversial. Data protection law 
forms part of the legal institutions determining the unfolding of competi-
tive processes, and this needs to be accounted for when enforcing compe-
tition law. Put differently, data protection needs to be considered for the 
purposes of “establishing the relevant counterfactual, to the same extent as 
any other regulatory requirement would be considered by the Commission 
in its assessment”.38 
35 European Commission Decision of 3 October 2014, Facebook/Whatsapp, case COMP/M.7217, 
paragraph 164.
36 See Tommaso Valletti, “The role of data and privacy in competition”, Testimony Before the 
House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative law, 18 
October 2019; see also Cristina Caffarra and Tommaso Valletti, “Google/Fitbit review: Privacy IS 
a competition issue”, Vox CEPR Policy Portal, 2020, https://voxeu.org/content/googlefitbit-review-
privacy-competition-issue#.Xl-025mfgNo.twitter.
37 Already in Hustinx “Data protection”. Since at least 2014, many have been the important doc-
trinal contributions on this interaction. For a recent overview comprising also consumer law see 
Marco Botta and Klaus Wiedemann, “The interaction of EU Competition, consumer, and data 
protection law in the digital economy: The Regulatory dilemma in the Facebook odyssey”, The 
Antitrust Bulletin 64, no. 3 (2019): 428.
38 Massimiliano Kadar and Mateusz Bogdan, “‘Big data’ and EU merger control – A case review”, 
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 8, no. 8 (2017). See also “Competition law and 
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As to the second, namely the substantive level, the Preliminary Opinion 
first notes that a full market analysis for any of the “free” digital services 
at the time of the writing was still missing and suggests that the focus of 
the competition authorities be directed towards “assess[ing] the value of 
personal information as an intangible asset”39, while considering that “[c]
ompany expansion and broadening of their range of [data-related] services 
can blur the borders between markets”.40 The EDPS warns in this regard 
that neglecting “to acknowledge the increasing importance of personal 
information as an intangible asset risk ring-fencing more and more ser-
vices reliant on mass personal data processing (…) outside the scope of 
enforcement (…) of competition rules”.41 The Google/DoubleClick deci-
sion is criticised in particular for not considering how the merger could 
have affected the users whose data would be further processed by merg-
ing the two companies’ datasets and therefore “neglected the longer term 
impact on the welfare of millions of users in the event that the combined 
undertaking’s information generated by search (Google) and browsing 
(DoubleClick) were later processed for incompatible purposes”.42 Finally, 
besides complex aspects related to the identification of the relevant mar-
kets for the competition policy assessment, the EDPS considers that mar-
ket power in the age of big data is “partly driven by the degree to which a 
given undertaking can actually, potentially or hypothetically collect and 
diffuse personal information.”43 
From a purist’s perspective,44 the EDPS’s substantive and, possibly, adver-
sarial incursion into competition policy’s well-guarded terrain was not 
data”, Autorité de la concurrence and Bundeskartellamt, 2016, 23, https://www.bundeskartellamt.
de/SharedDocs/Publikation/DE/Berichte/Big%20Data%20Papier.html?nn=3591568 (“The fact 
that some specific legal instruments serve to resolve sensitive issues on personal data does not 
entail that competition law is irrelevant to personal data. Generally speaking, statutory require-
ments stemming from other bodies of law may be taken into account, if only as an element of 
context, when conducting a legal assessment under competition law”).





44 See Reuben Binns and Elettra Bietti, “Dissolving privacy, one merger at a time: Competition, 
data and third party tracking”, Computer Law & Security Review, in press (2019): 6 (“We define 
the purist conception of antitrust as the understanding that antitrust is a pure discipline with rigid 
boundaries, focused on the promotion of market efficiencies and the limited correction of market 
failures. The claim that underlies a purist view of antitrust law is that markets are mostly capable 
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particularly welcome. “Ostensibly neutral economic analysis and estab-
lished enforcement practices”45 felt annoyingly threatened. According 
to this view, perceived “public interest” considerations expressed by the 
data protection regime have no place in competition proceedings, and, 
besides, factoring in privacy concerns would intolerably distort and com-
plicate competition analysis and proceedings.46 Moving on from these 
more extremist positions, it appeared increasingly clear, however, that in 
so-called zero-price markets the identification of the true parameters on 
which firms compete is necessarily more complex than in traditional com-
petition analysis, as the possible harm cannot be assessed in terms of a tra-
ditional price increase. Thus, in case of merger control, degraded data pro-
tection post-transaction can be the harm that competition authorities are 
required to assess and prevent, such as, for instance, requiring more per-
sonal information from the merged party’s users or supplying such data to 
third parties.47 Whereas a privacy degradation, was eventually conceded, 
could affect the quality as a competition dimension and thus, ultimately, 
consumer welfare, this is considered unlikely to happen in actual, real case 
scenarios. Several reasons for this are commonly alleged, such as the exist-
ence of a “privacy paradox” (namely the that consumers care about pre-
serving privacy, but few actually take steps to protecting it) from which to 
infer that different consumers value privacy in different ways and there-
fore “the relationship between privacy and quality is purely subjective”.48 
Moreover, there would be an ambiguous relationship between privacy 
and other elements of product quality, as access to more user data could 
have an overall positive effect on product quality.49 At any rate, privacy 
of correcting themselves and thus that any regulatory interference in markets must be kept to an 
absolute minimum”).
45 Costa-Cabral, Linksey, “Family ties”.
46 D. Daniel Sokol and Roisin Comerford, “Does antitrust have a role to play in regulating big 
data?”, in The Cambridge Handbook of Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and High Tech, ed. Roger 
D. Blair and D. Daniel Sokol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Geoffrey Manne 
and Ben Sperry, “Debunking the myth of a data barrier to entry for online services”, Truth on 
the Market Blog, 26 March 2015, under “antitrust”, https://truthonthemarket.com/2015/03/26/
debunking-the-myth-of-a-data-barrier-to-entry-for-online-services/.
47 Cfr. Maria Wasastjerna, “The role of big data and digital privacy in merger review”, European 
Competition Journal 14 (2018), 417, 423.
48 See James C. Cooper, “Privacy and antitrust: Underpants gnomes, the first amendment, and 
subjectivity”, George Mason Law Review 20, no. 4 (2013): 1129, 1135-1138.
49 Cfr. Geoffrey Manne and Ben Sperry, “The problems and perils of bootstrapping privacy and 
data into an antitrust framework”, CPI Antitrust Chronicle 5, no. 2 (2015).
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could be taken into account only when objective evidence is provided that 
in the specific circumstances of the case it is an important competition 
parameter, and balanced against the transaction’s (likely) substantial effi-
ciencies in zero-price markets. Within these limits, however, few would 
deny that competition policy and data protection law could still converge 
on the need to protect “privacy competition” whenever this was likely to 
emerge. 
In a March 2016 speech, the EU Competition Commissioner signalled 
the intention to increasingly consider the role of data in merger control.50 A 
first tangible turning point51 with regard to the interplay between data pro-
tection and competition law was marked, eight months after the speech, 
by the Microsoft/LinkedIn merger decision.52 Arguing against the back-
drop of what was stated by the CJEU exactly ten years earlier in Asnef-
Equifax,53 the argument was made from within the EU Commission that, 
whereas the enforcement of data protection rules as such falls outside the 
competition authority’s remit, “privacy consideration may have a role to 
play in merger control”.54 In the Microsoft/LinkedIn merger decision, the 
Commission has embraced the argument that proposed mergers could in 
some cases raise privacy issues that cannot be assessed separately from 
competition policy issues55 and not shied away from engaging in a thor-
ough analysis of at least some of the privacy implications of a specific 
transaction. First, the Commission acknowledged, based on the results 
50 Margrethe Vestager, “Refining the EU merger control system”, European Commission, 2016, under 
“Speeches and articles about Mergers”, https://wayback.archive-it.org/12090/20191129204644/
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/refining-
eu-merger-control-system_en (“in this digital age, we find that mergers often affect competition 
for a service that’s offered free of charge. Often what attracts users to a service isn’t its price or any 
inherent quality, but how many other people use it. And sometimes data can be the most valu-
able asset a company owns. Fortunately, our rules allow us to take all of these issues into account 
when we review a merger. Our test is nimble enough to be applied in a meaningful way to the ‘new 
economy’, which is after all not so new anymore”).
51 See Agustín Reyna, “The psychology of privacy – what can behavioural economics contribute to 
competition in digital markets?”, International Data Privacy Law 8, no. 3 (2018): 240; Ben Holles 
de Peyer, “EU Merger control and big data”, Journal of Competition Law & Economics 13, no. 4 
(2018): 767, 784.
52 European Commission Decision of 6 December 2016, Microsoft/LinkedIn, Case COMP/M.8124, 
C(2016) 8404.
53 See footnote 34 above.
54 Eleonora Ocello and Cristina Sjödin, “Microsoft/LinkedIn. Big data and conglomerate effects in 
tech markets”, Competition Merger Brief, Issue 1/2017 (2017): 5. 
55 See also “Competition law and data”, at 23.
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of its market investigation, that privacy in the case at hand was indeed 
an important parameter of competition.56 Second, the Commission stated 
that the potential foreclosure of competing providers of professional social 
networking services could give rise to consumer harm, inter alia, because 
it could lead to the “marginalisation of an existing competitor which 
offers a greater degree of privacy protection to users than LinkedIn (or 
make the entry of any such competitor more difficult)”,57 thereby restrict-
ing consumer choice as to the level of data protection offered by a pro-
fessional social network. Thus, the Commission’s merger analysis antici-
pated privacy degradation post-transaction as a consequence to a change 
in the market conditions brought about by the proposed merger. In the 
end, the EU Commission allowed Microsoft to acquire LinkedIn subject 
to behavioural remedies. When commenting on the merger decision, the 
EU Competition Commissioner held that “by getting commitments from 
Microsoft that will keep the market open, we’ve helped to allow compa-
nies to compete to protect privacy more effectively”.58 In this respect, the 
Commission did not assess any possible effects on privacy deriving from 
the mere concentration of personal data in the merged entity. It was reaf-
firmed, instead, that “[a]ny privacy-related concerns flowing from the 
increased concentration of data within the control of Facebook as a result 
of the transaction do not fall within the scope of the EU competition law 
rules but within the scope of the EU data protection rules”.59 
56 European Commission Decision of 6 December 2016, Microsoft/LinkedIn, Case COMP/M.8124, 
C(2016) 8404, footnote 330 (‘The results of the market investigation have indeed revealed that 
privacy is an important parameter of competition and driver of customer choice in the market 
for PSN services”). Instead, in the Facebook/WhatsApp merger decision, the Commission came 
to the conclusion that the majority of consumer communications apps (e.g. Facebook Messenger, 
Skype, WeChat, Line, etc.) did not (mainly) compete on privacy features, despite the fact that an 
increasing number of users valued privacy and security, and would have therefore be dissatisfied 
if, after the merger, end-to-end encryption were abandoned, see European Commission Decision 
of 3 October 2014, Facebook/WhatsApp,Case, COMP/M.7217, C(2014) 7239. 
57 European Commission Decision of 6 December 2016, Microsoft/LinkedIn, Case COMP/M.8124, 
C(2016) 8404, paragraph 350.
58 Margrethe Vestager, “What competition can do – and what it can’t” (communication, Chilling 
Competition Conference, October 25, 2017).
59 European Commission Decision of 6 December 2016, Microsoft/LinkedIn, Case COMP/M.8124, 
C(2016) 8404, paragraph 164.
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IV.  Data accumulation/gathering is appearing on the radar of 
competition authorities
Long before techlash became popular, even among world economic elites,60 
and critical voices from inside and outside the antitrust community were 
taken seriously also by competition enforcers (and their respective gov-
ernments), the EDPS was already holding up a mirror to the EU competi-
tion authority. Not only the effectiveness of competition rules’ enforce-
ment in the age of big data was questioned, but the suggestion was made 
that a possible solution could be to substantially improve the interaction, 
i.e. strengthen the family ties between competition, data protection and 
consumer protection. From the EDPS’ perspective, the Microsoft/LinkedIn 
decision was, possibly, a (small) step in the right direction, but much more 
needed to be done. Highly favourable was instead the EDPS’ response to 
the 2019 Facebook decision by the German competition authority (Federal 
Cartel Office, Bundeskartellamt) scrutinizing Facebook’s terms of service 
under German competition law.61 The Bundeskartellamt found that these 
terms of service, which allowed Facebook to collect extensive amounts of 
user data from third-party sources, were in breach of EU data protection 
law and amounted to an abuse of a dominant position. On 7 February 2019, 
the day following the date of the Bundeskartellamt’s public announcement, 
Giovanni Buttarelli wholeheartedly welcomed the decision.62 The EDPS 
noted how “[p]owerful tech companies pose multiple challenges to law-
makers in Europe and elsewhere on many levels and vigorous enforcement 
of competition rules in the EU is one important element in addressing 
them”. He also pointed out that his institution had “consistently supported 
competition authorities taking action to combat abuse of dominance in a 
market by means of exploitation of consumers (in accordance with Article 
102 of the Treaty)” and therefore they were feeling “encouraged by this 
decision”. 
60 See “Year in a word: Techlash”, Financial Times, 16 December 2018, https://www.ft.com/
content/76578fba-fca1-11e8-ac00-57a2a826423e (“This year will be remembered as the moment 
big tech faltered. At January’s World Economic Forum in Davos, investor George Soros questioned 
the economic and political power of tech companies and their ability to manipulate public opinion 
in ways that challenge what John Stuart Mill would have called “the freedom of mind”).
61 Bundeskartellamt Decision of 6 February 2019, Facebook B6-22/16.
62 Giovanni Buttarelli, “Big step towards coherent enforcement in the digital economy”, EDPS Blog, 
7 February 2019, https://edps.europa.eu/press-publications/press-news/blog/big-step-towards-
coherent-enforcement-digital-economy_en.
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Indeed, the 2014 Preliminary Opinion already noted that “[a]busive 
exploitation which most obviously could harm the consumer, such as the 
application of excessive prices or unfair discrimination, has (…) rarely been 
confronted by competition authorities and in most cases of exploitation 
the ‘victims’ have been companies, not end consumers”63 and suggested 
that this type of abuse might require much more attention by competition 
authorities in the age of big data. The EDPS proposed the example of a 
dominant firm in the market for email services that launches a new photo-
sharing platform, nudges users of the email service into downloading and 
using the photo-sharing platform (to which users become increasingly 
dependent), and then exploits them by weakening data protection controls 
through the imposition of a revised privacy policy. This, according to the 
Preliminary Opinion, besides possible questions of exclusionary conduct 
through tying, could raise issues of exploitation under Article 102 TFEU.64 
Following up on these early reflections, the 2016 Opinion suggested “using 
data protection and consumer protection standards to determine ‘theories 
of harm’ relevant to merger control cases and to cases of exploitative abuse 
as understood by competition law under Article 102 TFEU, with a view to 
developing guidance similar to what already exists for abusive exclusion-
ary conduct”.65 
Understandably, the Facebook case by the Bundeskartellamt attracted 
significant attention from within the competition policy community. 
While this is not the place to reproduce the extremely stimulating legal 
and economic debate that ensued both before and after the decision,66 it 
is worth noting that, to some extent, the German authority conducted a 
natural experiment.67 To put it differently, the Bundeskartellamt embarked 
63 “Preliminary Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor”, 21.
64 Ibid., 29.
65 “Opinion 8/2016”, 15.
66 See Marco Botta and Klaus Wiedemann, “Exploitative conducts in digital markets: Time for a 
discussion after the Facebook decision”, Journal of European Ccompetition Llaw & Practice 10, no. 
8 (2019); Viktoria Robertson, “Excessive Data Collection: Privacy Considerations and Abuse of 
Dominance in the Era of Big Data”, Common Market Law Review 57, no. 1 (2020): 161-190.
67 See Luca Rancati, “The intersection between Antitrust and data protection. Lessons from the 
Facebook/ Whatsapp merger and the Bundeskartellamt’s decision on Facebook’s terms and con-
ditions”, Faculté des sciences économiques, sociales, politiques et de communication, Université 
catholique de Louvain, 2019, 49, https://dial.uclouvain.be/memoire/ucl/fr/object/thesis%3A21242. 
The economist Cristina Caffarra also recently remarked that the German Facebook decision 
resembled a natural experiment, cfr. “CRA Conference, Antitrust in Times of Upheaval – a Global 
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on a discovery tour to a still largely unexplored region,68 albeit relying on 
German legal precedents developed far from the digital sphere. Judging 
from the clear words of the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court (OLG 
Düsseldorf) deciding on the appeal to the first instance in interim pro-
ceedings, the experiment has so far produced  at least “mixed” results,69 
unless the German Federal Court of Justice, where the case is actually 
pending, or even the CJEU,70 decide otherwise. Facebook’s application 
for suspensive effect of the Bundeskartellamt’s decision was unhesitantly 
granted by the OLG, which also left little doubt as to the fate of the main 
proceedings before the same Court.71 
With regard specifically to the interplay between data protection and 
competition law, it should first be noted that the Düsseldorf Court does 
not rule specifically on the alleged infringement of data protection law, 
which occupied roughly one third of the Bundeskartellamt’s Decision, as 
this will be part of the upcoming full assessment. What the Court is how-
ever unequivocally rejecting is that there could be an automatic finding 
of an abuse of dominance under Section 19(1) of German Competition 
law (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, GWB) on the grounds 
of Facebook’s alleged infringement of data protection law. Facebook’s data 
processing, according to the Düsseldorf OLG, does not constitute an abuse 
of a dominant position in the form of exploitation of users.72 According to 
the Bundeskartellamt, Section 19(1) GWB, “which relies heavily on deci-
sions about values based on both fundamental rights and ordinary law 
in order to determine abusive conduct, has so far found no equivalent in 
European case law or application practice”.73 The Authority considers that, 
Conversation, Brussels 10 December 2019”, https://events.streamovations.be/sessions/reference/
antitrust-in-times-of-upheaval-a-global-conversation [at 2:13:19].
68 See Rupprecht Podszun, “After Facebook: What to Expect from Germany”, Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice 10, no. 2 (2019): 69 (“I prefer to see it as a ‘pioneering’ case, where a 
competition agency exhausts the full potential of competition law rules (here: exploitation of con-
sumers as an abuse) in a subject matter that had not yet been explored before (personal data). That 
seems necessary to me in times when we are wondering how to shape competition policy in the era 
of digitisation. Such cases may even help to fight off more interventionist regulation”).
69 OLG Düsseldorf VI-Kart 1/19 of 26 August 2019, Facebook.
70 Decision of 26 November 2015, SIA “Maxima Latvija” v. Konkurences padome, Case C-345/14, 
EU:C:2015:784.
71 Christina Möllnitz, “Datenschutz ist kein Wettbewerbsrecht”, Computer und Recht 35, no. 10 
(2019): 640, 641 (“ verbal slap in the face”).
72 Nor in the form of exclusion of competitors.
73 Bundeskartellamt Decision of 6 February 2019, Facebook B6-22/16, paragraph 914.
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first, according to German law, the provisions of the EU data protection law 
are mandatory principles for assessing whether Facebook’s privacy notices 
are reasonable, and in this way principles of EU data protection law are 
incorporated into Section 19(1) GWB. The Bundeskartellamt then assesses 
Facebook’s abuse by applying those principles, i.e. a normative criterion 
based on values. An interesting question in this respect is whether, at least 
conceptually, the Düsseldorf OLG’s ruling represents any, even minor, 
constraint on any following attempt of using data protection to determine 
“theories of harm” relevant to cases of exploitative abuse under Article 102 
TFEU, as was indeed suggested by the EDPS.74 At any rate, the Court seems 
to consider Section 19(1) GWB much less “exceptional” than according to 
the legal interpretation of the Bundeskartellamt.75 As noted by Rupprecht 
Podszum in the immediate aftermath of the Düsseldorf OLG’s ruling, “[p]
erhaps, the [Bundeskartellamt] would have done itself a favour if it had 
gone much further and if it had brought up the courage to say: Yes, we are 
trying a novel theory of harm here! This is antitrust law for the digital age! 
And we are now seriously trying to take exploitative abuses to the spotlight 
after decades of ignorance!”.76
Regardless of the ultimate outcome of what could easily escalate into 
yet another (legal) antitrust saga, the undisputed merit of the German 
Facebook case, ongoing already since 2016, is that it has at long77 focused 
competition enforcers’ and other stakeholders’ minds on the otherwise 
obscure mechanisms of data gathering in online advertising markets. 
Since the opening of the German Facebook investigation, these mecha-
nisms have been thoroughly investigated by the ACCC first78 and more 
recently by the UK competition authority.79 Another positive effect could 
be to inspire data protection authorities to adopt a interpretative (risk-
based) approaches increasingly reliant on concepts of dominance akin to 
74 “Opinion 8/2016”, 15. See also D’Cunha, “In memory”, 130 (“As the first legal skirmish in the 
first battle in what promises to be a prolonged confrontation, it also inadvertently demonstrates 
the need for authorities to pool their expertise”).
75 Möllnitz, “Datenschutz”, 641 s.
76 Rupprecht Podszun, “Facebook vs. Bundeskartellamt”, D’Kart Antitrust Blog, 2019, https://
www.d-kart.de/en/blog/2019/08/30/en-facebook-vs-bundeskartellamt/.
77 See Binns and Bietti, “Dissolving”.
78 See footnote 19 above.
79 “Online platforms and digital advertising”.
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competition law.80 Conversely, however, a pro-competitive assessment of 
data protection law81 could fuel some legitimate doubts as to the efficacy 
of protecting data subjects and consumers by heavily relying on consent 
(“terms and conditions”). It should not be overlooked, however, that the 
General Data Protection Regulation,82 less than two-year old at the time of 
the writing, is a very complex piece of legislation whose scope and bear-
ings still need to be adequately tested. Finally, it is abundantly clear that it 
should not be the role of competition agencies to proactively enforce data 
protection law simply because the competent data protection authorities 
might be unable to do that due to lacking powers, resources83 and/or due 
to other institutional hurdles. 
V.  Concluding suggestions: family happiness in this time of fast and 
radical change
In the coming years, the relationship between data protection law and 
competition law is going to become increasingly crucial in the EU and 
elsewhere, especially against the background of the Internet of Things and 
likely algorithmic advances. In the spirit of Giovanni Buttarelli,84 this part 
discusses a few ways in which the family tree could be nurtured in the 
interest of consumers and data subjects going forward. 
Exploring new forms of coordinated enforcement between authorities
Whereas considering privacy as a dimension of quality competition is by 
now well established in EU competition law, further implications of the 
interplay between these two areas of law against the background of the 
speed of evolution in technology markets are less well apprehended, as 
80 See, for instance, the, “Preliminary Opinion on data protection and scientific research” EDPS, 
2020, https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/20-01-06_opinion_research_en.pdf 
(“A public interest basis under data protection law for dominant companies to disclose data to 
researchers would need to be clearly formulated and laid down in EU or Member State law, as well 
as being accompanied by a rigorous proportionality test and appropriate safeguards”).
81 See Vezzoso, “Pro-competitive”.
82 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC.
83 D’Cunha, “In memory”, 130 (“Now we see that it becomes harder to enforce privacy rules (…) 
the more powerful a company becomes (…) This is illustrated by the recent $5 billion settlement 
for the violation of the 2011 consent decree that was negotiated between the FTC (not imposed by 
the FTC on) Facebook”, emphasis in the original).
84 Vestager, “Privacy and competition”.
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suggested also in the previous Sections. In a one-page Statement, to be read 
in the context of the EU Commission’s investigation into the proposed 
acquisition of Shazam by Apple, the European Data Protection Board 
(EDPB)85 stressed the urgency to “assess longer-term implications for the 
protection of economic, data protection and consumer rights whenever a 
significant merger is proposed, particularly in technology sectors of the 
economy”. The EDPB considered that there was a link between “[i]ncreased 
market concentration in digital markets” and a threat to (degradation of) 
“the level of data protection and freedom enjoyed by consumers of digital 
services”. More broadly, the Board considered that “data protection and 
privacy interests of individuals are relevant to any assessment of potential 
abuse of dominance as well as mergers of companies, which may accu-
mulate or which have accumulated significant informational power”.86 The 
EDPB expressed similar considerations more recently, with regard to the 
proposed acquisition of FitBit by Google. According to the Board, “[t]here 
are concerns that the possible further combination and accumulation of 
sensitive personal data regarding people in Europe by a major tech com-
pany could entail a high level of risk to the fundamental rights to privacy 
and to the protection of personal data”. It also “urges the parties to mitigate 
the possible risks of the merger to the rights to privacy and data protection 
before notifying the merger to the European Commission.” The EDPB also 
reiterated its offer to “contribute its advice on the proposed merger to the 
Commission if so requested”.87
The concerns of data protection authorities regarding longer term, 
broader welfare effects than traditionally considered by the competent 
authorities when enforcing competition law is understandable and jus-
tified.88 For once, in striking contrast to the ideal of a knowledge-based 
society, a data-based economy is characterised by situations of profound 
asymmetries of information. First of all, as the ACCC explains, “consum-
ers are generally not aware of the extent of data that is collected nor how it is 
85 The EDPS is also a member of the Board. 
86 “Statement of the EDPB on the data protection impacts of economic concentration”, EDPB, 27 
August 2018, https://edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/our-documents/autre/statement-edpb-data-
protection-impacts-economic-concentration_pt.
87 “Statement on privacy implications of mergers”, EDPB, 19 February 2020, https://edpb.europa.
eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpb_statement_2020_privacyimplicationsofmergers_en.pdf.
88 D’Cunha, “In memory”, 131 (“Concentration in markets, for which there is now ample evidence, 
has an obvious impact on meaningful choice when it is all but impossible to opt-out of participa-
tion in digital life”).
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collected, used and shared by digital platforms” and these latter moreover 
“tend to understate to consumers the extent of their data collection prac-
tices while overstating the level of consumer control over their personal 
user data”.89 Digital platforms in particular have significant incentives to 
accumulate a broad range of increasingly detailed personal information 
about the largest number of consumers, and to persuade them to permit 
this to occur. To achieve this, these market players often resort to hidden 
tracking technologies, as well as to the concealment of their data practices 
from the consumers based on a toxic mix of legal and technological meas-
ures.90 An ensuing and plausible concern is that the abundant informa-
tion collected about consumers could be used against them,91 according 
to the dynamics and imperatives of so-called “surveillance capitalism”.92 
A further important information asymmetry affecting the society at large 
lies at a deeper level, namely between the human and the “machine”: only 
machines (i.e. the sophisticated data analysis techniques fuelling them) 
are increasingly able to systematically extract valuable information out of 
masses of structured and unstructured data that are otherwise incompre-
hensible to the human mind. Several are the significant implications of 
these asymmetries from a broader societal perspective, which our insti-
tutions are still struggling to apprehend. It is already abundantly clear, 
however, that some forms of information asymmetries can be sources of 
market failure to the extent that they prevent competitive processes from 
operating effectively and efficiently. Compounded by network effects and 
economies of scale and scope,93 they have already given rise to the phe-
nomenon of Big Tech, with which competition authorities worldwide are 
currently trying to come to terms.94 
Given the significance of the phenomenon, and the need to respond 
quickly and effectively to the challenges it poses, it is already quite appar-
ent that an appropriate reaction would need to go beyond what competi-
tion law, data protection (and consumer protection) working in silos can 
89 “Digital platforms inquiry”, 23; see also Crémer, Montjoye and Schweitzer, “Competition pol-
icy”, 28.
90 Cfr. Katharine Kemp, “Concealed data practices and competition law: Why privacy matters”, 
2019, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3432769.
91 Crémer, Montjoye and Schweitzer, “Competition policy”, 28. 
92 Zuboff, The Age.
93 See also Section II above.
94 See “Online platforms and digital advertising” for the latest comprehensive analysis of this phe-
nomenon with regard to Google and Facebook, as well as for a broad array of possible solutions.
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traditionally provide. On the one side, new forms of coordinated enforce-
ment between authorities should be urgently explored.95 Interesting in 
this respect is the proposal made by the EDPB in the already mentioned 
Statement, in which it was suggested that data protection authorities can 
assist competition authorities with the assessment of the impact of poten-
tial abuses of dominance as well as mergers “on the consumer or society 
more generally in terms of privacy, freedom of expression and choice” as 
well as with the “the identification of conditions or remedies for mitigat-
ing negative impacts on privacy and other freedoms.” Both the substantial 
assessment and the identification or remedies could be “separate to and 
independent from, or integrated into, the analysis carried out by competi-
tion authorities during their assessment under competition law”.96 On the 
other, this could facilitate the full exploration of the normative dimension 
of privacy with regard to competitive processes.
Digital Clearinghouse 4.0 
Besides traditional enforcement, competition policy is bound to take an 
increasingly regulatory turn.97 On the one side there is the increasing 
recognition that traditional enforcement action is no longer enough to 
address the broad concerns emerging from digital markets, and that some 
form of complementing ex-ante regulation is required.98 On the other side, 
there is a broader role for competition authorities to play in accompanying 
(giving an “helping hand” to) the shaping of the digital markets in a way 
that better aligns the interests and incentives of the firms with those of 
consumers and society. 
Data protection authorities are likely to be supportive of changes mak-
ing competition policy more effective in dealing with big data issues, as 
they have often noted that under the current market conditions it is very 
difficult for individuals to be in control of their data. Moreover, if data 
protection considerations have entered the competition arena, there is of 
95 D’Cunha, “In memory”, 130 (“The big challenge is to move on to consider real-life investiga-
tions”).
96 “Statement of the EDPB”.
97 Furman et al., “Unlocking digital competition”, under “Competition”; “Online platforms and 
digital advertising”; Rupprecht Podszun and Fabian Brauckmann, “Germany’s pressing ahead: 
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course much work to do putting competition consideration into the data 
protection arena.99
Intense interactions are already happening on a case-by-case scenario, 
as the Facebook case shows, but going forward more structured forms of 
collaboration are going to be needed, following in the steps of the EDPS’ 
initiative to create a Digital Clearinghouse. Officially launched on 29 May 
2017, the Digital Clearinghouse currently meets twice a year.100 The 2016 
EDPS Opinion already suggested that, among the activities that could be 
carried out by Digital Clearinghouse, there was “using data protection and 
consumer protection standards to determine ‘theories of harm’ relevant to 
merger control cases and to cases of exploitative abuse as understood by 
competition law under Article 102 TFEU, with a view to developing guid-
ance similar to what already exists for abusive exclusionary conduct.”101 
During the second meeting, one of the topics discussed was the develop-
ment of “[b]est practice for data protection and consumer authorities to 
support competition authorities in the case of digital sector mergers”.102 
As a follow up to the second meeting, during the third meeting regula-
tors focused on theories of harm related to collusive and personalised pric-
ing. Non-price factors in competition and consumer enforcement analy-
sis were discussed during the fourth meeting, as well as how the essential 
facility theory applies to the specificities of data resources.103 The topic 
of regulating non-monetary price services was further explored during 
the fifth meeting.104 Interestingly, the already mentioned February 2019 
Facebook decision of the Bundeskartellamt was discussed in parallel to the 
consumer action taken by the European Commission, together with con-
sumer protection authorities and concluded in April 2019, which led to a 
change to the company’s “Terms and Services”.105 Finally, at the November 
2019 meeting the more ex-ante perspective was discussed, in particular 
with regard to connected cars and fintech.106
99 For a very early and incomplete attempt see again Vezzoso “Pro-competitive”. 
100 See “Big data & digital clearinghouse”, EDPS, 2019, https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/our-
work/subjects/big-data-digital-clearinghouse_en. 
101 “Opinion 8/2016”, 15 (reference omitted).
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Going forward, the importance of the Digital Clearinghouse as a forum 
in which the interplay between data protection and competition policy 
(and consumer law) are discussed against the background of the evolving 
technological scenario is poised to grow.107 One of the outputs of these 
joint reflections could be the publication of opinions or statements swiftly 
providing guidance to the market actors. Moreover, the format of the 
Digital Clearinghouse should be replicated and institutionalized at the 
national level.
Developing a pro-competitive data framework 
Finally, discussions should converge on the need to jointly develop a pro-
competitive data governance framework in which data subjects can effec-
tively control their data. There is much to do to create more competition 
and innovation in the digital economy in the interest of consumers and 
data subjects. Whereas the numerous reports and studies recently pro-
duced by competition authorities, governments and other stakeholders in 
the process of adjusting the policy framework to the new economic (and 
social) reality have put forth a number of very promising data-related pro-
posals aimed at strengthening competition policy in the digital age, a truly 
comprehensive pro-competition data governance framework is still largely 
missing. A pro-competition data governance would ideally be led by a pro-
gressive agenda that aims at mobilizing data to enable competition and 
innovation and provides consumers with the means to exercise their true 
sovereignty.108 A suitable data governance framework would then accom-
107 For some concrete proposals on how “to optimise public enforcement in digital markets by 
enhancing the co-operation between competition agencies, data protection and consumer bod-
ies in the EU” see also Agustin Reyna, “Optimizing public enforcement in the digital single 
market through cross-institutional collaboration”, 2020, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3529198.
108 For some encouraging reflections in this same direction, see the recently published 
Communication by the European Commission, A European strategy for data, 19 February 2020, 
at 20 (“Individuals should be further supported in enforcing their rights with regard to the use of 
the data they generate. They can be empowered to be in control of their data through tools and 
means to decide at a granular level about what is done with their data (‘personal data spaces’). 
This could be supported by enhancing the portability right for individuals under Article 20 of the 
GDPR, giving them more control over who can access and use machine-generated data, for exam-
ple through stricter requirements on interfaces for real-time data access and making machine-
readable formats compulsory for data from certain products and services, e.g. data coming from 
smart home appliances or wearables. In addition, rules for providers of personal data apps or novel 
data intermediaries such as providers of personal data spaces could be considered, guaranteeing 
their role as a neutral broker”, reference omitted).
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pany and support the ongoing digital transformation of the economy with 
its manifold opportunities for data-driven innovations and improved con-
sumer outcomes. 
The root of this approach can be found in what is already well known as 
“Open Data”, a movement that has opened-up and continues to open-up 
valuable public data assets in an increasing number of sectors.109 In the 
UK context, the most widely-cited Open Data’s success story is Transport 
for London (TfL), which has been making available public transport data 
to developers for free and real-time since 2009. Thanks to TfL’s open data 
policy “a number of new business and products have been created, includ-
ing some competing directly with TfL’s complementary products, such as 
Citymapper”.110 Open Banking has brought this idea forward by showing 
that it is possible to develop workable frameworks for safe access to data, 
thereby overcoming technical challenges and misaligned incentives.111 
What Open Banking also suggests is that there are huge, and partly unex-
pected, potentials in terms of new and innovating products and services 
when the ‘opening’ and ‘flowing’ of even a relatively small slice of data are 
carefully structured and monitored. Moreover, aftermarkets and comple-
mentary markets, especially in digital ecosystems, are per se worth pro-
tecting, also independently from switching considerations.112 
Of course, it should be always borne in mind that what worked in a sec-
tor (e.g., banking) could not work (or less effectively) in another sector 
(e.g., social media services). In particular, consumers make careful choices 
in some contexts but less so in others,113 and, even beyond the current state 
of data protection law, much more should be done to put consumers in 
real control of their data. Along similar lines, competition policy experts 
appointed by the EU Commissioner advocate for the development of 
“institutional models that may both help the data subjects to exercise their 
109 There is no shortage of open data’s definitions, but basically it can be understood as referring to 
data made available in a format that is open and machine readable, and which is published under 
a license that places no restrictions on the data’s further use. 
110 Furman et al., “Unlocking digital competition”, 74.
111 Ibid., at 5.
112 See Wolfgang Kerber, “Data sharing in IoT ecosystems and competition law: The example of 
connected cars”, Journal of Competition Law & Economics (2019), Advance Access publication.
113 “Data Availability and Use, Inquiry Report, No. 82, 31 March 2017”, Australian Productivity 
Commission, 2017, https://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/data-access#report (“When the 
expected benefits are clear, individuals have a stronger incentive to share their data, or to actively 
consent to their data being shared by those who already have it”).
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data sovereignty effectively and promote competition”.114 Finally, besides 
governance of data as top-down governance, it is useful to start thinking 
of data governance also as data for governance. In this respect, data is cru-
cially important also for experimenting with alternative ways in which to 
participate in the society and in the economy (e.g., data commons, coop-
eratives, etc).
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